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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
have stated the true basis for its decision, namely, the policy considerations,
and should not have clouded the area with illogical semantics. The problems
caused by such a decision can easily be discerned in the instant case. Here,
Olak was not overruled but in fact was relied on by the majority. The Court
declared that the crimes were identical in both states and only the defenses
to that crime differed. If Olah is to be followed, this distinction. is invalid. As
the dissent stated, "these differences support [defendant's] . . . conclusion
that he could have been convicted in North Carolina of acts which would not
support a conviction in this state."' 0 That principle was apparently vital in
the Olalh decision. The Court of Appeals in Olak and in the instant case has used
questionable reasoning in arriving at its decision. The former case appears to
be diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of section 1941; the latter
case, an exception to Olah, is in accord with the legislative intent of this
habitual criminal statute.
Bd.
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Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree; his sole defense
was predicated on the theory of insanity. In support of defendant's contentions,
his expert witness testified that psychiatric examinations on three occasions
before trial revealed that defendant had a syphillitic condition resulting in
brain damage and had a medical record of two head injuries resulting in
unconsciousness at the time of each injury. Following this testimony, the doctor
was asked the hypothetical of whether a person having a similar history, who
on the night of the killing consumed a considerable quantity of liquor, would
be laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and
quality of his act or that such act was wrong. The doctor characterized such
a person as one "suffering with pathological intoxication" and "insane." Defense
counsel then asked him if it was his testimony that the defendant was insane
at the time of commission of the act. The answer, however, was precluded by an
objection which was sustained, but the court later asked this question of a
medical expert for the prosecution, who had made an examination of defendant
before trial to determine defendant's capability of understanding the charge,
and he answered that the defendant was not insane at the time of his act. The
district attorney, in his closing argument, implied to the jury that since the
prosecution witness testified to actual experience and defense counsel merely
to insanity based on the hypothetical, the prosecution witness' testimony was
entitled to more weight. Defendant appealed from his conviction, and the
Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, reversed and ordered a new trial.
Held: failure to allow the defense witness to testify as to his opinion based on
10. People v. Perkins, 11 N.Y.2d 195, 197, 182 N.E.2d 274, 276, 227 N.Y.S.2d 663,
665 (1962).
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direct knowledge was reversible error which was aggravated by allowing the
prosecution witness so to testify and by allowing the district attorney to use
this situation in his remarks 'to the jury. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 510,
180 N.E.2d 561, 225 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1962).
New York has traditionally followed the M'Naghten rule in excusing
a person from criminal liability if at the time of the alleged criminal act, he
was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and
quality of the act, or knowing the nature and quality, he did not know
the act was wrong.' Experts called to testify as to legal sanity are limited
to opinions based upon proper hypothetical questions grounded on facts in
evidence and to opinions derived from their personal observation and examination of the defendant.2 A medical witness with personal knowledge is permitted to state his opinion as to the defendant's condition before stating his
premises, but the court in its discretion may require the witness to state the
facts before he expresses his opinion; opposing counsel may also elicit these
facts on cross-examination. 3 Aside from legal insanity as a defense to the crime,
no person is compelled to stand trial while insane, and upon request to the
court, a psychiatrist will be ordered to examine the defendant prior to trial,
to determine his capability of understanding the charge. 4 The introduction of
such a report is specifically prohibited by statute but may be waived, in which
case it may be a question of fact whether the defendant introduced such evidence as his own.5 The Court, in the instant case, reversed plainly because the
defendant's psychiatrist, who had personally examined the defendant, was
refused the opportunity to testify directly as to defendant's mental condition
at the time of the crime, a refusal grounded on the fact that his opinion was
elicited directly after a hypothetical question was posed to him, which contained
an assumed fact in evidence but not within the direct experience and knowledge of the expert. This was aggravated by the disadvantage the defendant
was put to by the allowance of the prosecution's witness to do so and further
aggravated by the district attorney's critical distinctions concerning the weight
these testimonies should be given by the jury. It further held that it was
reversible error to allow the prosecution's witness to testify concerning defendant's ability to understand the charge. Such testimony, it concluded, was
expressly forbidden by section 662 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was
also "irrelevant." The dissent agreed that the psychiatrist for the prosecution
should not have been allowed to testify concerning defendant's ability to
understand the charge, but it believed that this and the denial of the opinion
based on direct testimony was not so prejudicial. It believed that the trial
1.
2.
3.
4.

N.Y. Penal Law § 1120.
See People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 145, 11 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1937).
See People v. Faber, 199 N.Y. 256, 266, 92 N.E. 674, 678 (1910).
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 658.

5.

People v. Roth, 11 N.Y.2d 80, 181 N.E.2d 440, 226 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962).
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court properly acted within its discretion in regulating the admission of opinion
based on direct knowledge and the premises underlying this opinion.
Although defense counsel was attempting to convey to the jury the impression that its expert had actual knowledge of defendant's alleged intoxication
by his question after the hypothetical problem, there appears no valid reason
for the Court to hold as a matter of law that the question should have been
answered and that no objection shouild have been made. The position of the
question immediately following the hypothetical, although misleading, could
have been posed in another form, alerting the jury to the fact that the question
was being asked with regard to the expert's personal observation. Indeed,
since the court has discretion in regulating whether a medical expert should
prefix his opinion with reasons, perhaps it should also instruct the person
posing the question on the desired procedure, so as not to confuse the jury.
Reversal, nonetheless, was warranted, since the immaterial testimony of the
prosecution's witness tended to cloud the question of insanity. Testimony
elicited by a psychiatrist, appointed by the court to determine defendant's
ability to understand the charge, is a humanitarian gesture at most. Reports
by such psychiatrists are not admissible by statute,0 and testimony, by the same
token, should not be introduced. Information obtained by such an investigation
may amount to testimonial compulsion. 7 Moreover, capacity to understand
the charge and to defend it at the time of trial involve different norms than
insanity at the time of the commission of the act. 8 Although a person may
be deemed guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, our society has recognized that
a criminal act may be excused if the defendant was legally insane. Since the
defendant in the instant case predicated his entire defense on the ground of
insanity, he should be allowed to present this defense without being hampered
by evidence which is not in issue.
L. H.S.
READING OF INFLAmmATORY ARTICLES BY JURORS HELD NOT ENOUGH
WARRANT MISTRIAL

To

In People v. Genovese' the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction on the charge that he acted as a fight manager without having procured
the required license.? The Court was concerned with the question of whether
the defendant had been denied federal as well as state due process. After the
jurors had been sworn but prior to the introduction of evidence, four articles
appeared in three New York newspapers which reflected unfavorably on the
defendant's character. 3 Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the publica6. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 662.
7. People v. Roth, supra note 5, at 83, 181 N.E.2d at 441, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
8.

Ibid.

1. 10 N.YS.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d

419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962).
2. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8907, 8933 (McKinney 1961).
3. One of the articles referred to the defendant as a convicted narcotics boss. The
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